AQA PHILOSOPHY 3.4 METAPHYICS OF MIND Please note, this is not a completed worksheet. It is left blank for students to complete using the Metaphysics of Mind textbook, Routledge, Michael Lacewing Worksheet for the following part of the specification: Dualist theories Substance dualism -Minds exist and are not identical to bodies or to parts of bodies. -The indivisibility argument for substance dualism (Descartes). Responses, including: -the mental is divisible in some sense -not everything thought of as physical is divisible. -The conceivability argument for substance dualism (expressed without reference to God) (Descartes). Responses including: -mind without body is not conceivable -what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible -what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world. Issues facing dualism as a whole Issues facing dualism, including: -The problem of other minds -Dualism makes a “category mistake” (Gilbert Ryle) Responses including: -the argument from analogy -the existence of other minds is the best hypothesis. Issues facing interactionist dualism, including: -the conceptual interaction problem (as articulated by Elisabeth, Princess of Bohemia) -the empirical interaction problem. Issues facing epiphenomenalist dualism, including: -the challenge posed by introspective self-knowledge -the challenge posed by the phenomenology of our mental life (ie as involving causal connections, both psychological and psycho-physical) -(not included) the challenge posed by natural selection/evolution.

AQA PHILOSOPHY 3.4 METAPHYSICS OF MIND Example answers for the following part of the specification: What do we mean by ‘mind’? -Features of mental states: -All or at least some mental states have phenomenal properties -Some, but not all, philosophers use the term ‘qualia’ to refer to these properties, where ‘qualia’ are defined as ‘intrinsic and non-intentional phenomenal properties that are introspectively accessible’ -All or at least some mental states have intentional properties (ie intentionality). Dualist theories Substance dualism -Minds exist and are not identical to bodies or to parts of bodies. -The indivisibility argument for substance dualism (Descartes). Responses, including: -the mental is divisible in some sense -not everything thought of as physical is divisible. -The conceivability argument for substance dualism (expressed without reference to God) (Descartes). Responses including: -mind without body is not conceivable -what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible -what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world. Issues facing interactionist dualism, including: -the conceptual interaction problem (as articulated by Elisabeth, Princess of Bohemia) -the empirical interaction problem. Issues facing epiphenomenalist dualism, including: -the challenge posed by introspective self-knowledge -the challenge posed by the phenomenology of our mental life (ie as involving causal connections, both psychological and psycho-physical) Issues facing dualism, including: -The problem of other minds -Dualism makes a “category mistake” (Gilbert Ryle) Dualist responses including: -the argument from analogy -the existence of other minds is the best hypothesis.